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1Foreword
This study was prepared for the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs. The views
contained in this report represent those of the principal researcher, Are Knudsen, and
not necessarily those of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) or the Chr.
Michelsen Institute (CMI). The report is based on a literature review and selected
magazine and newspaper articles from the international and the Pakistani press as well
as interviews. The interviews were tape-recorded in Pakistan by Mohammad Manzar
Zarin, who also prepared the English translation (Appendix I). Richard Moorsom proof-
read the manuscript.
AK, Bergen, September 2002
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3Executive summary
This report examines the growth of political Islam in South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan
and India’s Jammu and Kashmir Province). It is structured around cross-referenced
themes that are central to the growth of political Islam. It is argued that there are a
number of contingent factors that account for the growth of political Islam and are
related to the course state-formation took in these countries as well as the politicisation
of Islam in the Middle East over recent decades. Together these factors contributed to a
groundswell of political Islam that now represents a formidable challenge to the civil
and military leaders in South Asia.
In Pakistan the failure of parliamentary democracy and the weakening of civil society
have spurred the growth of social protest in the form of a political Islam. The Pakistan
army likes to portray itself as the guardian of democracy but is in fact an obstacle to it.
The army has consistently intervened in the political process and vetoed decisions
considered contrary to its interests. The frequent power struggles between elected
governments and the opposition as well as military coups have prevented Pakistan from
developing viable democratic institutions. This has contributed to the growth of political
Islam and has given political protest a religious outlet. The call for implementing Sharia
(the holy law of Islam) and the expansion of jihad (in the sense “holy war”) are
examples of political protest expressed in a religious idiom.
The Kashmir conflict has for half a century marred relations between India and Pakistan
and is currently the biggest security threat in the region. The intensification of the
conflict since 1989 in the form of an insurgency against Indian rule was in large
measure due to growth of political Islam. Some of the most ruthless militant groups are
engaged in the struggle for what they see as the liberation of Kashmir and, more
recently, in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The militant groups engaged in sectarian
conflict (Sunni vs. Shia) or the Kashmir insurgency draws their members and fighters
not from the country’s poor but from its lower middle class. The organisations are very
hard to control and have recently stepped up terrorist attacks on foreigners in Pakistan.
4Some these attacks may have been carried out in connection with Taliban and Al Qaeda
“cells” in Pakistan.
The Taliban movement was created and nurtured by Pakistan and support for its regime
in Afghanistan was a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Following the fall of the
Taliban regime, some of the fighters fleeing Afghanistan have sought refuge in
Pakistan’s tribal belt along the Afghan border. There is considerable support for the
Taliban in the orthodox “Quran belt” in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Region and
some of the resident Pashtun tribesmen have provided security cover to fleeing Taliban
fighters and Al Qaeda members. The presence of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda in
Pakistan could pose a political challenge to the fledgling Afghan leadership in Kabul. It
might also pose a security risk to the foreign missions and religious minorities in
Pakistan but not to the Pakistani authorities.
The growth of political Islam has to a considerable degree been caused by the
proliferation of Islamic seminaries (madrasa) since the outbreak of war in Afghanistan
in the late 1970s. Increased control over the seminaries have been difficult to implement
and is fiercely resisted both on religious and political grounds. The seminaries’ blend of
literacy and militancy has made them a convenient scapegoat for the growth of Islamic
militancy in Pakistan. Although the seminaries have played a key role in the
radicalisation of Pakistan and helped create the Taliban movement, their role in creating
a groundswell of political Islam seems exaggerated. The failure of parliamentary
democracy, the deliberate state Islamisation programme under Zia ul-Haq (1977–88)
and the Pakistan army’s patronage of militant Islamic groups have all contributed to the
growth of political Islam.
Pakistan may be under siege from Islamic militants, but is not about to be taken over by
them. Pakistan is still a moderate Islamic country, but with a growing and increasingly
violent Islamic militant lobby. The army is still firmly in charge but because of its
patronage of the key militant groups, cannot take decisive action against them. The
patronage support to the militant groups and religious parties have been important for
advancing Pakistan’s foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Despite
5considerable international pressure, Pakistan has only reoriented rather than revoked
these policies. This probably reflects a power struggle within the army and its powerful
intelligence branch, the ISI.
The mainstream political parties (PPP, PML) are weakened and their leaders in exile.
Recently, president Musharraf has tightened his grip on power, so that the prospects for
a true democracy are bleak. The power struggle between the president, the prime
minister and the Chief of Army staff is bound to continue following elections later this
year. This means that any elected government will be short-lived. In fact, during the
past 55 years not a single elected government in Pakistan has served its full five-year
term. They have all been deposed by presidential fiat or removed in a coup d’état.
Following Pakistan’s decision to join the US-led attack on the Taliban regime, the
religious parties (JI, JUI) have strengthened their popular support but in contesting the
forthcoming elections they will again be marginalised.
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7Introduction
The attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 had a series of
repercussions for political Islam in South Asia, Pakistan’s future political course and the
relationship between India and Pakistan. It also brought Osama bin Laden and his Al
Qaeda network to world attention and ultimately led to the American offensive against
Afghanistan’s Taliban regime that began in early October the same year. Within weeks,
the political backdrop for the future of political Islam on the subcontinent was
irrevocably changed: the Taliban regime was ousted, Pakistan was embraced as a key
ally in the campaign against “terrorism”, and India – Pakistan’s main adversary – was
sidelined. In addition, sanctions against Pakistan were lifted and economic aid was
forthcoming. Was Pakistan able to capitalise on these gains? This report argues that
Pakistan has neither been able to wrest control of the roots of Islamic resurgence nor of
its own destiny.
This study focuses on Pakistan because it is generally considered the lynchpin for the
growth of political Islam on the subcontinent. Pakistan was instrumental in nurturing the
Taliban and aided the movement in its rapid takeover of Afghanistan in 1996. Within
Pakistan, the same policy that helped launch the Taliban contributed to the rapid growth
of a plethora of Islamic militant groups. These groups have in turn grown powerful
enough to become a challenge to state security and a threat to the country’s internal
stability. By covertly supporting Islamic militant groups in Kashmir, Pakistan has for
the past decade engaged in a “proxy war” in India’s Jammu and Kashmir Province. For
the past year the Kashmir conflict has brought India and Pakistan closer to war than any
time since 1971. The conflict is a major security threat to the region and despite
international pressure on both countries, is in danger of erupting again if the militant
groups are able to stage new attacks and suicide missions in Kashmir.
In January 2002 president Musharraf declared war on Islamic extremists, but there is
still little evidence of the government fulfilling its promise. The militant
groups have in recent months staged a number of terrorist attacks in Karachi. There has
also been an influx of former Taliban fighters into Pakistan’s tribal areas and major
8cities. These may pose a future security threat, especially if they align themselves with
the virulent extremist organisations that currently operate there. In order to understand
these developments and the future of political Islam in Pakistan, Afghanistan and
India’s Jammu and Kashmir Province (Figure 1) it is important to look more closely at
the many factors that have allowed political Islam to flourish during the past few
decades.
Figure 1: Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir
91. Religion
Islam
The term Islam (Ar. Islâm) means “submission to the will of God”.1 Of late there has
been increasing interest in Islam not as a religious faith but as a political ideology. This
has variously been termed “political Islam”, “Islamic revival”, “Islamic resurgence”,
“fundamentalism”, “Islamic extremism” or simply “Islamism”. In this report the term
“political Islam” is taken to mean the various ways Islam is used as a charter for
political action at the individual, regional and state level. This does not mean that
political Islam is a unified political movement. This is also evident in the Indian
subcontinent, where moderate Islamic parties, militant groups and terrorist organisations
all claim to represent a particular brand of political Islam. What unifies them is a
common concern with Islamising society – what separates them is the means by which
to achieve this goal.
In the study of political Islam it is important to distinguish between what Oliver Roy
calls “Islamism” and “neo-fundamentalism” (Roy 1994). The Islamists wants to purify
Islam and reform the state with a particular emphasis on the introduction of Sharia – the
holy law of Islam (see SHARIA). Although implementation of the Sharia is a goal,
society needs to be Islamised. Islamists approve of schooling for women and their
participation in social and economic life. The Islamists maintain their right to individual
interpretation of the Quran and the Sunna (Traditions of the Prophet’s life) and they can
therefore be considered anticlerical. The importance the Islamists’ place in society
means that their political philosophy centres on the leader (amir) and the advisory
council (shura). Islamists believe in the reform of the state through social and political
action. To accomplish this it is necessary to “leave the mosque”, so to speak (ibid.: p.
36). The Islamists hence advocate a reform of society from “the top”. In Pakistan, the
                                                  
1 The transliteration of Arabic terms follows Netton (1992). After first use, the terms are written in a
simplified version without the use of diacritics.
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party that most closely fits this description is the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the largest and
most influential of the Islamic parties (see PARTIES).
During the 1980s the Islamists gradually lost momentum and a new breed of “neo-
fundamentalists” emerged. Instead of transforming society, there is again an emphasis
on implementing the Sharia. The right to individual interpretation of the Quran and the
Sunna is surrendered.2 Islamisation is now set to grow from below and no longer
through reform of the state (Roy 1994: p. 24). Compared to the Islamists, the neo-
fundamentalists therefore espouse a more dogmatic Islam, are less concerned with state
reform and more concerned with the implementation of Sharia, if necessary by violent
means in an Islamic revolution. Compared to the Islamists, they do not have a
distinctive theory of political organization. Moreover, they do not want women in
public life and place great emphasis on Muslim ritual (prayer), dress and behaviour. A
typical example of the neo-fundamentalist ideology is Afghanistan’s Taliban regime
(see TALIBAN).
The ideological roots of political Islam can be traced to the Middle East. The first
examples of an Islamic resurgence can be traced to the Society of the Islamic
Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928. Some years later, in 1941, Maulana Abdul-ala
Maududi established the Jamaat-e-Islami in what was then British India. These
organisations differed in many respects, but their common concern with Islamism was
evident. They have provided ideological and organisational models for contemporary
Islamic movements and organisations (Esposito 1997: p. 9). They range from the
Palestinian Hamas, which emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Afghan
mujahedin, which is generally considered the high point of the Islamist revival.
How should we interpret political Islam? There are, broadly speaking, two diverging
methodological approaches to the study of political Islam (Salla 1997). The
                                                  
2 The question of whether Islamic jurisprudence allows for individual reasoning or interpretation (Ar.
ijtihâd) is contested. The “reformists”, such as Maududi and Jamaat-e-Islami, maintained that
interpretation was not a prerogative of the clerics, and the movement may therefore be considered
anticlerical. The “traditionalists” (such as the Taliban) reject individual interpretation, maintaining that
only following or imitating (Ar. taqlîd) the tradition is allowed.
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“essentialists” give prominence to the textual interpretation of Islam, which they see as
enduring and immutable insight into the essence of Islam and the Muslim world. They
maintain that Islam is a monolithic threat to the West. An example of this school of
thought is Samuel Huntingdon’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis. The other group of
scholars, the “contingencists”, rejects this analysis and argues for a study less based on
scriptural Islam, and with a greater emphasis on the diversity in Islam based on studies
of Muslim practice. They argue that there is no monolithic Islam but a diversity of
movements, beliefs and practices. Their views are closely linked to the critique of
essentialism in Western scholarship as creating a false, dogmatic and “orientalist” image
of the Muslim world (Said 1978).
In the study of political Islam in South Asia it is important to keep in mind that the
Islamists are often portrayed negatively and equated with militant extremists. It is worth
noting that in many cases, political protest is a reaction against lack of democratic
rights, poor living conditions and a host of other failures of civil society (see FRONTIER).
In fact civil society has gradually weakened in Pakistan and is virtually non-existent in
Afghanistan. The failure of popular (parliamentary) democracy has also contributed to
the Islamic revival in the form of a dogmatic politicised Islam.
Jihad
One of the commonest terms used in connection with political Islam is “jihad” (Ar.
Jihâd). Etymologically the term comes from the Arabic root “jahada” meaning “to
struggle” or “to strive”. Despite being frequently used, the term is little understood in
the West and is often glossed as “holy war”. However, jihad has a more complex
meaning which is not linked to Islamic militancy and the global radicalisation of Islam.
As Barbara Metcalf (1984: p. 197) has noted, the Quran distinguishes between “the
greater jihad”, which can be translated as the “transformation of self”, and “the lesser
jihad”, which can be translated as “outright warfare or militance against enemies of
Islam”. “The ‘lesser’ ideally entails the ‘greater’”, says Metcalf, “an aspect of Islamic
movements often neglected by foreign observers” (ibid.). In Islam, the concept of jihad
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is therefore carefully circumscribed. The concept also concerns when jihad is legitimate
and a Muslim duty, as well as who has the right to call jihad. Despite this fact, jihad
tends to be used as synonymous with armed struggle (“holy war”). The concept has thus
become a favourite among the religious right and is deployed to legitimate the use of
violence against all enemies of Islam. In general, there is evidence of a gradual
decentralisation of the right to declare jihad and an attendant reinterpretation of jihad as
a duty for all Muslims. This expansion of jihad is one explanation why foreigners came
to fight alongside the mujahedin in Afghanistan. In the same manner, the fights in
Jammu and Kashmir have been couched in jehadist terms, so that these too could
legitimately be considered religious battles (see KASHMIR).
In President Musharraf’s speech to the people in January 2002 the importance of jihad
was a key issue and Musharraf claimed that the extremists had abused the concept of
jihad.3 As stressed by Musharraf in his speech, the lesser jihad (“holy war”) should be
abandoned in favour of the greater jihad. In short, the lesser jihad is neither relevant nor
valid. While Pakistan’s silent majority shares this view, radical Islamic groups
vehemently oppose it. For them, jihad in the form of a militant struggle is a religious
duty and their main raison d’être. This view is also shared by many clerics, religious
leaders as well as leading Islamic teaching institutions. Even the Jamia Ulumia Islami
(Institute of Islamic Learning) in Karachi, one of the largest and most influential
seminaries in Pakistan, stresses that “Jihad is compulsory for all Muslims” (Newsweek
2002).
While jihad has gained currency among a wider part of the population, the call for jihad
in the form of militant struggle has seen fewer adherents. This is demonstrated by the
fact that the call for jihad in relation to the attack on the Taliban leadership in
Afghanistan in October 2001 was answered by a tiny portion of the Pakistani populace.
                                                  
3 “In Islam, Jihad is not confined to armed struggles only. Have we ever thought of waging Jihad
against illiteracy, poverty, backwardness and hunger? This is the larger Jihad. Pakistan, in my opinion,
needs to wage Jihad against these evils. After the battle of Khyber, the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him)
stated that Jihad-e-Asghar (Smaller Jihad) is over but Jihad-e-Akbar (Greater Jihad) has begun. This
meant that armed Jihad i.e. the smaller Jihad was now over and the greater Jihad against backwardness
and illiteracy had started. Pakistan needs Jihad-e-Akbar at this juncture. By the way we must
remember that only the government of the day and not every individual can proclaim armed Jihad.
The extremist minority must realise that Pakistan is not responsible of waging armed Jihad in the
world” (Excerpted from, Musharraf 2002)
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The majority ignored the call for jihad. Failing to note this point leads to an
oversimplification of the political implications of jihad. An example of this is Jessica
Stern’s (2000) claim that Pakistan has a “jihad culture”. This gloss underestimates the
complexity of the growth of militant Islam during the past decade. Nonetheless, the
culture “card” is frequently used to explain Pakistan’s descent into lawlessness and
mayhem. The term “Kalashnikov culture” has gained currency among journalists and
the news media. It refers to the proliferation of automatic arms, especially the
Kalashnikov AK-47, which has increased the level of violence throughout the country.
There is no doubt that the proliferation of arms, together with the call to jihad in the
sense of “armed struggle”, has created a deadly mix that accounts for the growth of
Islamic militancy over the past decade.
In late February 1998 an Arabic newspaper based in London published the full text of
the call for jihad against the United States. The faxed declaration carried a lengthy title,
“Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders”,
and was signed by Osama bin Laden and leaders of Islamic militant groups in Egypt,
Pakistan and Bangladesh. The declaration blamed the United States (“the Crusaders”)
for desecrating the Holy Land “Arabia”, attacking Iraq and for supporting the Jews and
the state of Israel. These crimes, the declaration stated, were tantamount to a “war by
the Americans against God, his Prophet, and the Muslims” (cited in, Lewis 1998: p. 15).
On the basis of this, the declaration ended with a ruling (Ar. fatwâ) stating that hurting
America and killing Americans and their allies was every Muslim’s individual duty.
The declaration is typical of the political use of jihad – now interpreted as an individual
(rather than communal) Muslim duty – but unusual in the sense that it is not targeting
infidels or apostates but specifically targeted towards the United States and its citizens
and allies. This is important to keep in mind when considering the role of bin Laden and
his organisation, the Al Qaeda, in the region’s wars (in Kashmir) and Pakistan and in
the Taliban regime’s domestic policies (see TALIBAN, TERRORISTS).
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Sharia
Implementation of the Sharia (Ar. Sharî‘a) has been one of the major demands of
Pakistan’s religious “right”. The Sharia is not a legal document in the sense that
Western laws are, but a body of texts comprising the Quran (Ar., Qur‘ân) and the Sunna
(also known as the Hadîth), which gives a record of the saying and doings of the
Prophet Mohammad and his companions. This is regarded as a source of Islamic law
(dogma and ritual) only second to the Quran itself. 4
It is, however, important to distinguish between the political nature of Sharia and the
Sharia in religious terms. Pakistan, for example, has never implemented Sharia, but only
elements of it such as the Islamic penal laws (Ar. Hudûd, “limit”) in the form of the
Hudood Ordinance of 1979. During the rule of Zia ul-Haq the so-called Sharia Courts
were set up, led by an Islamic scholar or cleric (Qazi). Zia also introduced an Islamic
tax on bank accounts (Ar. zakât) and land (Ar. ushr), but the full implementation of the
Sharia was never effected.
On various occasions the former premier Nawaz Sharif tried to implement Sharia in the
form of a Sharia Bill that was first introduced in 1990 after having initially been
proposed by Zia ul-Haq in 1985 but never passed. In 1998 the Sharia Bill passed the
lower house of the Parliament with the help of the PML majority. However, to become
law, the bill had to be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. There the PML was in a
minority and the bill was stuck and has remained so since. As of 2002, the Sharia is not
implemented in Pakistan, although in a few areas of the NWFP the Sharia has been
implemented following local rebellion (Box 1). Villagers have lost faith in the country’s
secular laws and the judiciary, and demand justice through the implementation of the
Sharia. As Leonard Binder (1987) has observed:
The Islamic movements do not propose some form of Islamic policy to solve the
many problems, they rather urge the implementation of the sacred law [Sharia] for
                                                  
4 The four main sources (usûl) of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) are the Quran, Sunna, ijmâ‘ (consensus)
and qiyâs (analogical reasoning).
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its own sake and in the pious expectation that such implementation will either be
an efficient solution or bring some divine favour.
It is in this respect important to note that many of the Islamist parties oppose the
implementation of Sharia through governmental decree. Both the JI and the smaller
Sunni (Deobandi) groups such as Ahl-i-Hadith argue that the state cannot legislate
Sharia and in the late 1980s opposed the Sharia Bill (Roy 1994: p. 118). It is worth
noting that the Sharia has two important characteristics: its autonomy and its
incompletion. The first means that Sharia is independent of any state, state laws or
politics. In this sense the Sharia creates a separate religious domain or space that
prevents it from being manipulated. The second characteristic, incompletion, refers to
the fact that the Sharia is not “closed” in the sense that any legal opinion is never final
and can be reversed by a higher authority (ibid.: 9–10).
Seminaries
Most analysts agree that the religious seminaries (Ar. madrasa, pl, madâris) have
played a key role in the growth of Islamic militancy in Pakistan and beyond its borders,
in Afghanistan and India’s Jammu and Kashmir Province. The growth of the seminaries
began with Zia ul-Haq’s policy of a religious tithe (zakat) that was to be automatically
collected from people’s bank accounts. By the mid-1980s close to 10 percent of the
zakat funds went to the support of the seminaries (Nasr 2000). This allowed the
seminaries to mushroom, especially in the border areas of the NWFP. In 1982 the
government announced that seminaries that undertook certain changes in their
curriculum would be allowed to issue certificates that would be considered equivalent of
school certificates. This allowed the seminaries to recruit members from a much broader
spectrum of society and take up a more central role in society (ibid.: 146).
The seminaries offer the students free schooling and boarding. Some even pay the
parents for sending their children to the school. Most of the students come from rural
backgrounds (Malik 1999). In fact, most of the graduates from Deobandi seminaries in
the NWFP come from villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants (ibid.: 236). In rural
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areas, being a religious scholar, a Maulvi or a Maulana, is an honorific title and local
dignatories also now send their sons for religious education. The quality and breadth of
the education that is offered varies a lot. Most of the lower grade seminaries are based
on rote memorization of Arabic texts with few other subjects being taught. When the
students graduate, it is clear that their limited exposure to Islamic scholarship has not
prepared them for jobs in the private or government sector. Instead they are limited to
becoming low-level clergy (Mullah) and many of them remain jobless and form a
frustrated and volatile segment of the population. As low-ranked clergy preaching in
rural mosques, seminaries and other institutions, they tend towards dogmatic Islamic
extremism. As Nasr has pointed out, “this transformed madrasahs from intellectual
institutions to political ones” (2000: p. 152). The seminaries, hence, were politicised
and thanks to liberal funding, proliferated across the country. Following the outbreak of
the Afghan war in 1979, the seminaries also benefited from liberal donations from
abroad, especially from the Middle Eastern countries. The donations from Saudi Arabia
sources, especially, spurred the growth of the puritan brand of Islam known as
“Wahabism”, which is frequently mixed with Deobandi Islam. Pakistan’s Sunni
majority distinguish themselves into sects according to their school: Deobandi, Barelvi,
Wahhabi and Ahl al-Hadith, with the two first being most influential. Before the
outbreak of the Afghan war, the Barelvi sect was much larger and more influential than
the Deobandi. There is agreement that the traditional Barelvi-Islam which included
belief in saints and worship at shrines, has lost ground to Deobandi Islam. The rise of
Deobandi Islam has been a fundamental part of the growth of Islamic extremism.5
There have been frequent attempts to rein in the seminaries. In June 2000 the Pakistan
authorities attempted to register every seminary in the country. Out of an estimated
50,000 seminaries (the exact number is unknown), only about 4,350 schools registered.
The rest ignored the statute. The leader of the Federal Board of Islamic Seminaries
called the government’s edict a “threat to religion and religious values. We will not
permit any checking of accounts or funding sources, nor any review of our curriculum”
                                                  
5 The Deoband movement that has come to dominate in Pakistan’s seminaries can itself be traced to the
reformist Deoband movement established in 1867 in Deoband in Northern India. The Deobandis were
Muslim reformers who set up the first academy (madrasa) for the purpose of training future clerics (Ar.
Ulamâ).
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(Herald 2001d). The fierce resistance towards government control is both historically
and religiously motivated (Zaman 1999). This is also one reason why many of the
seminaries deplore government support in the form of state zakat funds. Many of them
consider this a “political bribe” that threatens the seminaries’ autonomy.
In late 2001 the “new madrassa strategy” was launched to increase the government’s
control over recruitment, financing and the curricula of the seminaries. There are a
number of reasons why the government has been cautious in extending its control of the
seminaries. One reason is the fear of offending the religious “right”. A second concern
is that the seminaries belong to time-honoured tradition and have been an important part
of legitimate social protest in South Asia. For many it is mandatory to keep the
seminaries separate from the state educational system. Only in this way can the role of
religion in society be safeguarded. A third and more pragmatic reason is that by
neglecting the formal schooling system, Pakistan has come to depend on the seminaries
for providing basic education. Pakistan spends less than 2 per cent of its gross national
output on public education (Singer 2001).6
The state’s neglect of basic formal education has had serious consequences and given
the seminaries a tremendous leverage on Pakistan’s youth. A more difficult question is
whether the seminaries have become “centres of Islamic militancy” and a “breeding
ground for terrorists”. There is a danger that in the eagerness to pin down the causes of
Pakistan’s drift towards Islamic militancy and sectarianism, the religious seminaries
become a simple target. According to government sources, only between 10-15 per cent
of the seminaries espouse a militant agenda. Other sources claim that of the around
2,700 seminaries registered in the Punjab, 750 are involved in military training and
1,700 receive foreign funding (Herald 2001d, see also, Zaman 1998). (Appendix III)
                                                  
6 In order to improve the education sector, the government of Pakistan recently asked Western countries
for financial and technical assistance ((Johannessen 2001).
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2. Politics
Parties
The political parties in Pakistan can broadly be defined as “mainstream” or alternatively
as “religious” or “Islamic”. The mainstream parties are the People’s Party Pakistan
(PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which throughout the 1990s shifted
power among themselves. Because of their failure to implement a lasting democracy in
Pakistan, both the parties and their leaderships have been weakened. Both of their
leading figures are gone: Benazir Bhutto is in self-imposed exile and Nawaz Sharif
expelled to Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that although the mainstream parties are not
Islamist in outlook, they have been instrumental in the growth of a political Islam in
Pakistan.
There are a number of Islamist parties, but only a few of them have any political clout
(see APPENDIX II). Chief among them is the oldest of the Islamic parties, Jamaat-e-
Islami (JI), led by Qazi Hussein Ahmed, a former university professor. The JI was
founded by the noted Islamic scholar and Maulana Abdul-Ala Maududi (1903–78).
Following Maududi’s teachings, the JI has strongly advocated the implementation of
Sharia as the only source of law. At the same time, the JI is a reformist party (with roots
in the Deobandi movement in pre-partition India), which for example favours schooling
for women. The JI also takes a liberal view concerning the question of interpreting
(ijtihad) the founding Islamic texts (the Quran and the Sunna) (see ISLAM). As will be
discussed in some detail below, the JI has formed coalitions with the mainstream
parties.
The other leading Islamist party is the Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). The JUI was
originally a religious movement set up by Deobandis. In the early 1960s it was
transformed into a political party and consequently split into different factions. The
Pashtun-dominated faction persisted and in the 1970s mobilised against military rule.
The JUI’s progressive Islamic programme was both strongly anti-American and anti-
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imperialist. In the 1980s, leadership of the JUI was taken over by Maulana Fazlur
Rehman (Rashid 2000: p. 89). Currently the JUI is split into two factions, one led by
Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) and another by Maulana Samiul Haq. Like many other
Islamic parties, the JUI tends to do poorly at national elections but has always been a
factor in the streets. In 1988 JUI-F (the faction led by Fazlur Rehman) got only seven
seats in the national assembly, in 1990 only six seats, in 1993, four seats, and in 1997
only two seats. In none of these elections did the JUI capture more than 3 per cent of the
electoral vote. It is worth noting that in the 1997 provincial elections, that is after the
Taliban regime had taken control of Afghanistan, the JUI-F failed to win a single seat in
the NWFP Provincial Assembly (ICG 2002). Apart from the Islamist agenda and
militant rhetoric, this underlines that the JUI has a very weak electoral base. Despite its
militant rhetoric the JUI has tended to distance itself from the militant sectarian
organisations but has forged close ties with those seeking to liberate Kashmir (see
KASHMIR). The pragmatic approach to politics is also evidenced by the JUI’s tendency
to ally itself with any party that can win it influence. When the JUI falls out of favour
and is excluded from the corridors of power, it becomes more oppositional and sharpens
its Islamic rhetoric (ibid.).
The JUI is an ardent supporter of the Taliban regime and its closest allies in Pakistan.
Following the US attack on Osama bin Laden in 1998, a pro-Taliban group called the
“Afghan Defence Council” was formed under the leadership of JUI’s Maulana Samiul
Haq, thereby uniting an otherwise divergent set of Sunni groups. The Jamaat-e-Islami,
which until then had been the only major party to remain opposed to the Taliban, also
joined the council (Herald 2001c: p. 32).
Despite the religious differences between the JI and JUI, both parties were ardent critics
of President Musharraf’s decision to support the attack on the Taliban regime. Both
Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) and Qazi Hussein Ahmed (JI) were detained or placed
under house arrest. Fazlur Rehman was even charged with treason. Not long after,
however, most of the detainees were released and the charges dropped, officially for
“lack of evidence”. Critics argued that the arrests were only a temporary measure to
appease India. The event shows, however, that the power of the Islamic groups and
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parties is overrated. Instead of threatening to overrun the state, they are dependent on
government patronage (see DEMOCRACY). This is reflected in this quote from a
prominent member of the JUI in the Sindh Province: “Jihadi groups can’t function and
survive without official patronage” (Herald 2001g: p. 58).
The role of the Islamic parties in Pakistan politics has differed over recent decades. In
brief, in the first epoch, the “guided democracy” of Ayub Khan (1958–69), the Islamic
parties were marginalised and sidelined. During this period the family laws were
secularised and the 1962 constitution even removed the term “Islamic” from the official
name of the state (Esposito and Voll 1996). The second epoch, that of Zulifqar Ali
Bhutto’s populist Islamic socialism (1971–77), was marked by an increasing appeal to
religion and promotion of Islam (introducing Islamic laws regulating the use of
alcohol). More controversial was Bhutto’s attempt to legitimise the state’s socialist
policies (nationalise banks, industries, land reform etc.) and couch this within a Islamic
idiom as expressing Islamic “equality” (musawwat) which was condemned by religious
leaders such as Maulana Maududi of Jamaat-e-Islam. This, together with other factors,
made Bhutto bow to the pressure and declare the Ahmadiya sect a non-Muslim
minority. Eventually, at the 1977 national elections the PPP was opposed by a broad
coalition of secular and religious opposition parties, the Pakistan National Alliance
(PNA), promising an Islamic system of government known as “Nizam-i-Mustafa” (“the
system of the Prophet Mohammad”). The elections were marred by irregularities that
eventually ended with a coup d’état by General Zia ul-Haq. The Zia epoch of Islamic
authoritarianism (1977–88) was crucial to growth of political Islam and indeed laid the
groundwork for the Islamic revival in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Where previous
regimes had tried to suppress or manipulate the Islamists, Zia succeeded in co-opting
them by forging an alliance with the main Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Soon
after taking power Zia embarked on a number of initiatives to Islamise the country, a
strategy that was meant to placate the Islamists. For a long time Zia’s strategy actually
succeeded in controlling the Islamists and it was not until after the 1985 elections,
where the Islamic parties performed poorly, that they became more critical of the Zia
regime (ibid.). In the post-Zia period (1988–96) and the return to democratic rule, the
mainstream political parties, PPP and PML, attempted to align themselves with the
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religious parties. Between 1988 and 1993, the Jamaat-e-Islam was part of a ruling
coalition led by the PML. Mutual distrust between the PPP and the Islamic parties
prevented them from forming a coalition.
Democracy
Pakistan has long had troubled relations with democracy. Since its inception more than
fifty years ago, Pakistan has experienced four military coups (Ganguly 2000). The first
was staged by General Ayub Khan (1958), followed by General Yahya Khan (1969),
General Zia ul-Haq (1977) and, finally, General Pervez Musharraf (1999). The end of
the Zia era opened the way for parliamentary elections. The first non-party elections
were held in 1985. The first democratic elections were held in 1988. And for the
remainder of next decade the civilian governments came and went. In 1990, 1993 and
1997, the PPP and PML shifted between carrying the majority of the votes but neither
succeeded the other after electoral defeat, all being deposed by the military or dismissed
by presidential fiat (Cohen 2002). Frequent political turmoil characterised this period
with the army watching closely and at times intervening (see PARTIES).
The latest military takeover took place in 1999, following the ill-fated Kargil crisis in
Kashmir (see KASHMIR). This humiliating defeat was the beginning of the end for
Sharif. Shortly after, in September 1999, a power struggle between Sharif and his hand-
picked leader of the Armed Forces, General Pervez Musharraf, sealed Sharif’s fate. He
was brought down in a bloodless coup led by Musharraf. Like his predecessor Zia ul-
Haq, Musharraf adopted the title Chief Administrator. Following a lengthy trial, the
former prime minister Nawaz Sharif was sentenced to life imprisonment but was later
(10 December, 2000) pardoned and exiled to Saudi Arabia. The people of Pakistan
welcomed the military takeover and the end of Sharif’s erratic government. Still,
Pakistan was becoming politically isolated and was sinking further in to the economic
quagmire, caused in part by the economic sanctions imposed on the country following
the nuclear tests conducted in May 1998. Internationally, Pakistan was increasingly
isolated and mostly due to the fiscal crisis, there was little money for the bold reforms
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that Musharraf had announced. In March 2000, Pakistan’s political isolation was
confirmed with President Clinton’s five-day tour of India and the perfunctory five-hour
stopover at a Pakistani airbase.
Pakistan’s fledgling democracy is a hybrid: a power-sharing arrangement between
civilian and military rule (Rizvi 1998: p. 110). The political troika leading Pakistan –
the Chief of Army Staff, the Prime Minister and the President – all vie for power. At
critical junctures when the Army has felt its key interests threatened, they have sacked
the prime minister, the president (or both) or if this was impossible, staged a military
coup. There has also been a continuous battle between the president and the prime
minister, each of whom has tried to reduce the others’ power. There has also all the time
been a serious power struggle with the fourth pillar of democracy, the judiciary (the
Supreme Court). Together this has meant that elected governments have been
ineffective and wasted much of their power in beating political enemies or avoiding
being dismissed by unconstitutional means. Instead of much-needed economic and
social reforms, the country has slipped into political, social and economic turmoil that
has laid the ground for discontent, disillusionment and opposition. In this respect,
democracy’s failure in Pakistan has laid the groundwork for the growth of political
Islam. Tired of elections (intekhab), the country has demanded accountability (ethasab)
(Malik 2001). This is especially important considering Pakistan’s crushing foreign debt,
most of it amassed under military governments. Currently the army consumes more than
one-fourth of the country’s national budget. The country’s nuclear programme has also
been very costly (Malik 2001). On top of this, corruption is rampant, Pakistan places
third on Transparency International’s list of the world’s most corrupt countries and tax
evasion is estimated to total more than 150 billion rupees per year (ibid.). Some
observers argue that the longer the military’s khaki bureaucrats rule the country, the less
the chance of coming to grips with Pakistan’s economic problems (ICG 2002).
The need for accountability and for saving the country from political and economic
turmoil has been the official reason for most military coups in Pakistan. Each time, the
military has portrayed its intervention as being in the best interests of country. The
army’s strength and the weakness of civilian institutions have made the army very
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strong and some argue, a threat to liberal democracy: “The military in Pakistan”, wrote
the Economist in October 2000, “is the problem to which it pretends to be the solution”
(Shah 2002). Nonetheless, the army has in general portrayed itself in the dual role of
guardian of the state as well of the Islamic ideology and protector of democracy. Shortly
after taking power in Pakistan on 12 October 1999, General Musharraf announced in a
televised address to the nation: “This is not martial law, only another path towards
democracy. … The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is
absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan”
(Constable 2001). This was in many ways reminiscent of Zia ul-Haq’s pledge in 1977 to
hold elections within three months, elections that never materialised. It is also worth
noting that only months after the coup, Musharraf demanded that judges in the Supreme
Court must pledge loyalty to the provisional constitutional order that had legalised the
military takeover in September 2001. While a few opposed taking an oath of allegiance,
the majority did so.
On 14 August 2001, Pakistan’s fifty-fourth Independence Day, president Musharraf
unveiled his “roadmap to democracy” and the plans for new elections to provincial and
national assemblies (and the Senate) in October 2002. But how fundamentally has it
changed Pakistani politics? It is rather the democratisation programme – what President
Musharraf has termed, the “roadmap to democracy” – that has been put on hold.
President Musharraf’s tenure could perhaps best be described as “liberal dictatorship”
and whether he will be able to institute a true democracy in Pakistan remains
questionable. The recent referendum (30 April 2002) on his presidency found that he
had bagged nearly all of the about 44 million votes cast. In a televised speech to the
nation following the election, Musharraf thanked Pakistan’s “silent majority” for their
support. The turnout for the election was about 70 percent, the highest in any election in
the country despite the fact that many of the opposition parties (including the PPP and
PML) belonging to the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) had asked
people to boycott the referendum. Although the legitimacy of Musharraf’s presidency
remains questionable, the referendum nonetheless enables him to stay in power for
another five-year term (2002–07). This of course also gives the Army an enormous
leverage in Pakistani politics, a position they seem unwilling to relinquish.
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Musharraf has been accused of preparing the ground for the elections in late 2002 by
making special engagements with the mainstream political parties, PPP and PML. In
particular the president has wooed the pro-military section of the PML leadership,
which many believe is meant to help the party win the elections (Shah 2002). As has
been mentioned previously, the army and the ISI have at critical junctures intervened in
the election process in order to buttress the PML’s chances of beating its main rival, the
PPP.7
On the other hand, Musharraf has initiated sweeping electoral reforms. The most
important part of these reforms is building a local democracy from the ground up
through non-partisan elections to local councils comprising more than 100 districts.
Secondly, candidates with business ties to the government are barred from running
while a university degree has become mandatory. Finally, the voter registration system
has been overhauled (Constable 2001: p. 24). Together these changes represent a major
restructuring. The question remains, however, whether the military leadership will be
able to follow through with these reforms.
As mentioned already, Pakistan’s democracy has been marred by continuing power
struggles between the president and the prime minister. In 1993 President Ghulam Ishaq
Khan dismissed prime minister Nawaz Sharif when he tried to wrest power from the
president. In 1996, President Farooq Leghari dismissed the government of Benazir
Bhutto and dissolved the National Assembly. To curb the power of the presidency,
Nawaz Sharif made sure of repealing the presidential prerogative of dismissing the
prime minister when he returned to power in 1997. A recent news bulletin suggests that
in this respect history repeats itself. According to this report, Musharraf plans a
constitutional amendment that will enable him to dismiss the prime minister and the
cabinet (BBC News 2002a). Under the current constitution, the president must act on
the prime minister’s advice. The planned amendment will reverse this, and allow
Musharraf to appoint his own prime minister as well the right to dissolve the parliament.
                                                  
7 In 1988, the ISI helped to reunify the PML, and to persuade a number of other parties to join the PML,
an alliance that was named Islami Jamhoori Ithehad (IJI, Islamic Democratic Alliance). (Rizvi 1998)
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In addition, it will secure a permanent role for his 10-member National Security Council
(NCS) headed by the president himself. It is expected that these changes will be
implemented ahead of the elections in October 2002.
Following the military intervention in Afghanistan, Musharraf seized the opportunity to
tighten his grip on power. In October 2001, the leader of the Army intelligence agency
(ISI), General Mehmood Ahmed, was eased out and replaced by lieutenant-general
Ehsanul Haq. Most analysts interpreted this as a move to curtail the pro-Taliban wing of
the ISI.8 This reflects the tendency to portray the officers in the Army as “moderates”
and the ISI officers as “hawks”. Following this line of reasoning, the ISI (and not the
Army) is held responsible for the growth of political Islam and religious extremism in
Pakistan, and, especially, the rapid rise of the Taliban and its military success in
capturing most of Afghanistan. An alternative analysis suggests that the ISI is not a
“rogue” agency, but firmly under the control of the army (ICG 2002). Musharraf’s
“shake-up” of the ISI was therefore not implemented to purge the agency of Taliban
sympathisers, but to get rid of a political opponent: Mehmood Ahmed commanded the
Rawalpindi corps, and was therefore a threat to Musharraf’s power. It is also worth
noting that during 1995–96 President Musharraf was Director-General of Military
Operations at the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. This position placed
Musharraf in a key role overseeing Pakistan’s support for the Taliban. Musharraf’s
military career therefore exemplifies the close links between the ISI and the military
(ibid.).
This also ties in with another myth, that of the “mullah versus military” (Shah 2002).
There has for many years been a consensus that the army and the Islamic groups are on
a collision course. An excellent study by the International Crisis Group suggests
otherwise (ICG 2002). This study argues that the army and the religious groups and
parties have a similar outlook on a number of key issues such as the defence budget and
the Kashmir and Afghan policies (ibid.). An example substantiating this argument is the
events following president Musharraf’s decision to join the international coalition and,
by implication, endorsing the attack on the Taliban regime. This decision was expected
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to generate mass demonstrations in Pakistan. Although there were protests and people
took to the street in cities such as Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi, the scale of the
demonstrations was relatively modest and easily contained by the Pakistani army. Many
of the protesters were Afghans and sympathisers from Pakistani religious parties. The
average Pakistani, though unhappy with Pakistan’s stance, did not take to streets. This
suggests that there is a symbiotic relationship between the Army and the Islamic
extremist groups. Far from being overrun by these groups, the military government has
used the groups to “justify its hold on power, improve its standing in the West and resist
restoring secular democracy” (ibid.).
Frontier
Nowhere in Pakistan has the call for the implementation of Sharia been stronger than in
the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). There are many reasons for this – historical
and contemporary as well as political. The NWFP is dominated by ethnic Pashtuns. The
Pashtuns are tribally organised and have traditionally resisted government control.
While most of the province is governed by the provincial assembly in Peshawar
(“settled areas”), a significant part (25 per cent) is loosely administered in the form of
“tribal areas” by the federal government (hence the name “Federally Administered
Tribal Areas”, FATA) where the local tribes enjoy considerable political autonomy
(Figure 2). The tribal areas are divided into seven tribal agencies located along the 2,400
km border with Afghanistan. Until 1996 there was no adult franchise in the tribal areas
and the villagers only had the choice of voting for accredited representatives (Malik) of
the tribes (Ali and Rehman 2001: p. 44ff). Nonetheless, the political setup of the tribal
areas remains unchanged, and is based on a complex power-sharing arrangement
inherited from British rule. It includes appointed representatives of the federal
government (“Political Agents”), local dignitaries (Khan), leaders (Malik), tribal elders
(spin giris, “white beards”) and clerics (Maulvi, Mullah). In times of internal conflict or
                                                                                                                                                    
8 Little is known about the ISI. According to Time Magazine the agency has a budget of US$ 45 million,
and a staff of about 10,000 (Time 2002b).
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in response to government intrusion they can call on tribal armies (lashkar) to fight
against enemies or invaders.
It is now well documented that in both the settled and tribal areas of the NWFP the
clerics, both low-ranked village “Mullahs” as well as educated Maulvis, have become
influential. Their power has grown at the expense of the secular leaders such as Maliks
and Khans. Many of the scholars have been able to convert religious authority into
political power and have contested provincial elections. This has been important for the
growth of political Islam, and periodic Islamic rebellions in the frontier. There are many
reasons – both internal and external – for this shift. The seminaries that popped up in the
wake of the Afghan war are one reason. Strung along the border with Afghanistan they
were originally conceived as a bulwark against communist expansion and for this
reason were generously supported by a number of Middle Eastern countries. Located on
the border with Afghanistan, there has traditionally been close contact between the
Pashtuns living on either side of the porous border. The influx of more than 2.5 million
Afghan refugees, perhaps a million of them now naturalised as citizens of Pakistan
(carrying Pakistani identity cards), also served to change the social fabric of the frontier.
The Taliban movement and the rise of Sunni fundamentalism in the so-called “Quran
belt” along southern Afghanistan has also strongly influenced the tribal areas. The
gradual radicalisation has increased the influence of the pro-Taliban parties such as the
JUI.9 Nonetheless, the JUI has been unable convert this into political power during
elections (see PARTIES).
                                                  
9 Nonetheless, the most influential political parties are still the PPP and the PML, in addition the Awami
National Party (ANP) propagating Pashtu nationalism (see PARTIES).
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Figure 2: NWFP and the Tribal Areas
It has also sharpened conflicts between the Sunni majority and the tiny Shia minority,
who tend to occupy better and more productive land, which in itself is a source of acute
tension. Due to increasing radicalisation of Shia and Sunni identities, sectarian
differences have been sharpened and the most severe clashes between Shias and Sunnis
in Pakistan have taken place in the NWFP. In 1996 about 200 persons were killed in a
five-day armed conflict between Sunnis and Shias in the Kurram Agency (Newsline
1996). A final reason for the radicalisation of the frontier has been local discontent over
poverty, abysmal living conditions and poor infrastructure in many parts of the
province. This has given rise to popular discontent that has spurred a religious rather
than political outlet and a demand for the implementation of Sharia (Box 1).
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Box 1
The demand for Sharia in the Malakand Division, NWFP
In February 1994 the Pakistani Supreme Court ruled that customary tribal courts (based on tribal
customs) should be replaced throughout the NWFP by government tribunals based on Pakistani
civil law. This was a move to extend the government’s control and power in the frontier at the
expense of the customary system of local self-rule and decision-making. This quickly sparked a
local uprising spurred by one of the emergent Islamic sects, the Tehrik Nifaz Shari‘a-e-
Mohammadi (TSNM) led by Maulana Sufi Muhammad. In 1989, Sufi Muhammad had left the
Jamaat-e-Islam to found the TSNM, which as the name implies was a movement to implement
Sharia law. To the TSNM the secular judicial system as well as the judges were corrupt and
heretical.
In May the same year, thousands of TSNM supporters converged on the historic Malakand Pass
guarding the entrance to Swat valley. The protesters rejected the government tribunals and
demanded the immediate implementation of the Sharia and Sharia courts. The sheer force of the
protest obliged the governor of the province to agree to their demand. The success of this show
of force increased the support of the TSNM, which rapidly spread to the neighbouring Bajaur
Agency and the Malkand Division (a settled area). Although the provincial authorities had
promised to implement Sharia, in reality the civil law and the Sharia coexisted. The
government’s half-hearted implementation of the Sharia was demonstrated in November the
same year when four visiting judges tried to settle pending court cases in Matta in upper Swat,
based on civil and not, as promised, on Sharia law. This enraged local villagers and sparked a
local outcry. Soon more than 600 tribesmen picked up their arms, took the judges hostage and
stormed the local administrator’s office. Not long after the word spread that the TSNM had
launched a jihad. This induced more tribesmen to join in and the rebellion swelled to include
more 5,000 armed men. They proceeded to take control of the major towns (Mingora, Saidu
Sharif), the airport, government buildings and police stations as well as to hold more than 60
government officials captive. To crush the rebellion, the government called in elite paramilitary
contingents of the Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Corps. In the ensuing conflict, 20 persons
were killed and a number of people arrested, including the TSNM leader himself, and the
rebellion subsided. Nonetheless, the force of the rebellion was enough for the provincial
authorities to bow to the rebels’ demand for implementing the Sharia. This was seen as a passive
submission to the militants’ demands. More demonstrations a month later also forced the
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authorities to release all the prisoners.
In interpreting this case, it is worth noting that the centre of the rebellion, Matta in upper Swat,
was not an extremist hotbed, but a bastion of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which at the
time also held the majority in the provincial assembly. Prior to the election the PPP
representatives had toured Swat and the Malakand Division and promised social reforms. In
Matta, the PPP supporters staged the largest mass meeting ever to be held in Swat. After the PPP
had won the election, none of the promised reforms was implemented, something which
disappointed and angered the local population. This transformed social and political discontent
into religious protest and support for the TSNM. The example also shows that the state has little
legitimacy in the area and attempts to curtail local self-determination are met with violent
opposition.
 Sources: (Herald 1994b, Lindholm 1999)
The volatility of the tribal areas often poses a stiff challenge to the federal authorities. In
some cases the tribal areas serve as sanctuary for criminals and suspected terrorists. The
frontier regions and the tribal areas are therefore important in the spread of political
Islam and may at times act as refuge for militants seeking protection from prosecution.
It is believed that following the collapse of the Taliban regime, a large number of the
Taliban were able to flee to Pakistan. An unknown number may have sought refuge in
the NWFP or, according to some reports, have established “terrorist cells” in the large
cities (see TERRORISTS). Whereas the tribal areas are known to harbour Taliban soldiers
(and perhaps also some of its leaders), it would be incorrect to claim that tribesmen in
the NWFP have a “natural affinity with terrorists” (Time 2002b). Instead, the tribesmen
have been sympathetically inclined towards their ethnic brethren with whom they also
share Pashtun cultural tenets – especially the Pashtun code of honour (Pashtunwali),
which among other things stresses the importance of hospitality and offering refuge. In
fact, the ethnic and cultural unity of the area has been the reason for the call for a
separate Pashtun state, Pashtunistan. It has been argued that Pakistan’s support for the
Taliban to a large degree was meant to check the growth of Pashtun nationalism in the
NWFP. This strategy backfired and the Taliban would neither accept the current border
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(the Durand Line) nor drop Afghanistan’s claim to a part of the NWFP (Rashid 2000: p.
187).10
Although many of the tribesmen were sympathetic to the cause of the Taliban and the
Al Qaeda, there was no outpouring of support for the Taliban and the call for jihad
against the Americans was rejected by the majority of the populace. The majority of the
angry protesters were Afghans residing in the major cities such as Quetta and Peshawar,
but only a few of them picked up a gun and joined the fighting in Afghanistan. The
majority of the protesters who joined the Taliban were members of the militant Islamic
movement known as the TSNM (see Box 1). Following the outbreak of the war in
Afghanistan in October 2001 about 2,000 (some sources say 10,000) TSNM supporters
heeded the call for jihad and travelled to the Pakistan-Afghan border (Herald 2001b).
Most of them were sent back by the local Taliban leadership. A few hundred laid down
their lives in Afghanistan while the remainder are missing in action. In January 2002,
the TSNM was one of five militant Islamic groups banned by the Pakistan government
(see APPENDIX II). The ban was justified on the basis of the organisation’s role in
“misleading thousands of simple poor people into Afghanistan” (Musharraf 2002).
                                                  
10 The Durand Line was established by the British in 1893 to create a buffer state in Afghanistan
separating imperial Russia from its empire in India.
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3. Militancy
Militants
Unlike the Islamist political parties, the militant organisations neither seek political
influence nor contest elections, but are engaged in a struggle to cleanse Islam and
restore Muslim society (see APPENDIX II). In their pursuit of this goal, the use of
violence is not only accepted but becomes an integral part of their armed struggle,
which is often couched as a jihad (see JIHAD). The use of unlicensed violence puts them
at odds with each other, the government and the Islamist parties (see PARTIES). The
militant groups in Pakistan are of two main kinds. The first consists of groups whose
main aim is to purify Islam. The majority of these groups are based in Pakistan. The
other type is the groups that are engaged primarily in the liberation of Kashmir. In this
section I will concentrate on the former, leaving the second to a separate discussion on
Kashmir (see KASHMIR).
As already mentioned, the Islamisation of Pakistan was a state enterprise that began
under the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88). From the late 1970s, Zia
embarked on a series of reforms meant to turn Pakistan into a truly Islamic state.
Among these was the imposition of zakat, a religious tax in 1979. The zakat policy was
fiercely resisted by Pakistan’s Shia minority, who demanded to be exempted from the
tax on religious grounds. Following large demonstrations in 1980, they were exempted
from the tax but this sowed the seeds of anti-Shia sentiments and a growing sectarian
violence. Over time these differences were manifested in a growth of new types of
movements which were virulently anti-Shia.
In 1980 the clash over the zakat issue led to the formation of a Shia movement called
the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP).11 As the name indicated, this was a movement for
the implementation of Shia law as opposed to the (Hanafi) Sunni legal school promoted
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by the Zia regime. The rise of a Shia organisation at the height of the Iranian revolution
was certain to provoke a countermove from Sunni zealots. In 1985, the first Sunni
organisation was formed under the name Anjuman Sipahi-e-Sahaba, but at a later stage
it changed to its current name, Sipahi-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The SSP, under the
leadership of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, started a hard-line anti-Shia agenda and demanded
that Shias be termed infidels (Ar. Kafîr) (Nasr 2000: p. 163). Thus began the strife
between the (Shia) TJP and the (Sunni) SSP, in which leaders and followers alike were
killed in bloody encounters and outright assassinations. When the SSP leader was killed
in 1990, an even more violent offshoot was created in his name, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LJ). The formation of the LJ in turn sparked the formation of another militant Shia
organisation, Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP) in 1993. Both the LJ and the SMP
are more ruthless than their parent organisations (SSP, TJP). In particular the LJ has
proved to be the most violent sectarian organisation ever to have existed in Pakistan
(Herald 2001f: p. 60).
Civilian governments have tried to curb the most virulent Islamic groups but have met
with little success. In 1998 the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif tried to curb extremism
and announced a crackdown on these groups. Shortly after, in January 1999, he was
nearly killed in a bomb attack carried out by the LJ. Backed by the military apparatus,
President Musharraf could strike harder against the militants. In mid-August 2001, the
government banned the two most violent organisations: the Sunni Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
and the Shia Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP). In addition, the sectarian
organisations from which they originated, the Sunni SSP and the Shia TJP, were placed
“under observation” (Herald 2001f).
The military takeover in October 1999 did little to quell the problem of sectarian
violence. In the two-year period (October 1999–August 2001) after the military
takeover, about 222 persons were killed and 200 injured in sectarian violence. Most of
these incidents took place in Karachi (33), leaving 54 people dead. In the tribal areas of
the NWFP 61 persons were killed in just seven incidents (Herald 2001e). Nonetheless,
compared to the situation under civilian governments the situation has improved
                                                                                                                                                    
11 The organisation was first called Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafariyya (Movement for the defence of the
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somewhat. For example, during 1989-94, the sectarian riots in Punjab killed 208
persons and injured more than 1,600 (Zaman 1999).
In January 2002, President Musharraf, now under pressure from India and the United
States to curb terrorism (see KASHMIR), reiterated the ban on the LJ and SMP, and
announced a further ban on their parent organisations, the SSP and the TJP. In addition,
two organisations active in Kashmir, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba, were
banned, as was a lesser known organisation, the Tehrik Nifaz Shari‘a-e-Mohammadi
(TSNM), whose members had joined the Taliban in the fight against the US troops in
Afghanistan (see FRONTIER). This meant that all the better-known sectarian
organisations in Pakistan were banned (SSP, TJP, LJ, SMP, TSNM) as well as two of
the hard-line organisations seeking to liberate Kashmir (see APPENDIX II).
Kashmir
Since 1947 the status of Kashmir has been a festering sore in relations between India
and Pakistan. The two countries have fought three wars over the region (1947, 1965,
1999), all of which Pakistan lost. The old feudal kingdom is today carved into three: the
Pakistani-held “Northern Areas” (pop. 1.5 mill.), the Pakistani-controlled “Azad (Free)
Kashmir” (pop. 2.8 mill.) and the Indian-held “Jammu and Kashmir Province” (pop. 9
mill.). The conflict is over the Indian part, which consists of three distinct regions: the
predominantly Buddhist Ladakh, the Hindu Jammu and the Muslim Vale of Kashmir.
The province as a whole is 75 per cent Muslim but the Vale of Kashmir, the centre of
the insurgency against Indian rule, is 95 per cent Muslim. Since 1948 Pakistan has
demanded the implementation of the Security Council resolution (Resolution 47, 1948)
demanding that the future status of Kashmir be decided by a plebiscite. For as many
years India has rejected this claim. Pakistan welcomes external arbitration in the
conflict, but India rejects third-party mediation and insists that this is a strictly bilateral
issue as enshrined in the Simla Agreement.
                                                                                                                                                    
Jafari [Shia] law).
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Most of the fighting takes place at the Line of Control (LoC), the 700 km cease-fire line
that was created after the Simla Agreement in 1972. The ritualistic shelling across the
LoC is indicative of the troubled relations between India and Pakistan but of little
military relevance beyond endangering the lives of the people on both sides of the LoC.
The deeper and more complex part of the conflict is concerned with the low-level
warfare carried out by Islamic militants and freedom fighters against an overwhelming
body of Indian security forces. Caught in the cross-fire, the social costs to the Kashmiris
have been formidable. Since the insurgency started in 1989, the number of people killed
has been at least 25,000; some even claim that 60,000 persons have been killed, most of
them civilians.12
The grassroots insurgency against Indian rule began after claims of extensive vote-
rigging during the Kashmiri elections in 1987 (Schofield 2000: p. 137). Soon after, the
first major pro-independence group was formed, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Force (JKLF), which was soon followed by other groups of Islamist persuasion such as
the Allah Tigers. However, these indigenous organisations were of little consequence to
the question of the future status of Kashmir. This changed with the emergence of the
Hizbul Mujaheddin (HM), another pro-independence group, which was founded in 1989
(see APPENDIX II). The HM does not, unlike some of the other militant groups, engage
in suicide attacks (Evans 2002) and in July 2000 announced a unilateral cease-fire.
Considered a betrayal by the other militant groups, the cease-fire crumbled a month
later.
In 1993 the about 30 pro-independence groups formed the All-Party Hurriyat
Conference (APHC). The aims of the APHC were threefold: to assure the rights of the
Muslim majority in the Vale of Kashmir, resolve the Kashmir problem through a
tripartite dialogue (India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris themselves) and end the Indian
army’s occupation of Kashmir and harassment of its Muslim population (Peace
Initiatives 2000). The APHC has consistently boycotted the local elections and is likely
to do so again in the elections later this year. Due to the boycotts, the strength of the
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political support enjoyed by the APHC is not known. For this reason, the APHC has
recently come under pressure from the United States and the European Union to contest
the upcoming elections.13
In 1994 the JKLF unilaterally renounced armed struggle and its leaders were set free.
By then the Indian counter-insurgency had wiped out many of the first-generation of
militants and fighters. However, the real battle for the future of Kashmir was yet to
come. In 1995, two new militant groups, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LT) and Harakat-ul-Ansar
(HUA), later renamed Harakat-ul-Mujadeen (HUM), appeared on the scene (Evans
2001a: p. 184).14 These groups introduced a foreign element into what had until now
been primarily an indigenous “independence” (azadi) movement. Both the LT and
HUM were based in Pakistan and their members consisted both of Pakistani nationals
and of Afghans and Arabs. The new fighters, euphemistically termed “guest militants”,
were better trained and armed than the Kashmiri-based groups and ideologically
motivated not so much by Kashmiri nationalism as pan-Islamism. It is thus from this
date that one calk talk of foreign meddling in the dispute and a “talibanising” of the
Kashmir conflict (Evans 2001b). This ideological shift thus coincided with the
emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1995–96. During the coming years, these
and other organisations of the same mould mushroomed and the conflict escalated into a
full-blown insurgency. This also drove out the last of the Hindu population in the Vale
of Kashmir, who since the early 1990s had been forced to resettle in government camps.
By the end of the decade, about 135,000 Kashmiri Hindus (“Pandits”) lived in refugee
camps in Jammu.
From 1999, the conflict escalated further when Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), another
militant group, took up armed struggle against the Indian occupation of Kashmir.
Founded by a former member of HUM, Maulana Masood Azar (see TERRORISTS), the
JeM has close links with the Sipahi-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), one of the militant Sunni
                                                                                                                                                    
12 Indian sources have estimated losses at 26,226, including civilians (10,310), security forces (3,520) and
terrorists (12,396). (Peace Initiatives 2000)
13 In the 1996 elections, the APHC’s boycott may have contributed to the landslide victory of the current
Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference Party, who was elected
unopposed.
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organisations in Pakistan (Table 1). Together with Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-
Mohammed has emerged as the most brutal and ruthless organisation active in Kashmir,
often relying on suicide squads for attacking Indian security forces and civilians.
The Kargil crisis in spring 1999 was a new example of more direct intervention in the
Kashmir conflict, a strategy that eventually backfired and led to a humiliating defeat and
political fiasco. In early spring battle-hardened fighters crossed the cease-fire line (LoC)
and took up positions in the mountains near Kargil. The mountains overlooked the
strategic supply route that connected Srinagar, the summer capital of Kashmir, with the
winter capital Jammu. According to some reports, the majority of the fighters belonged
to Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Despite Pakistan’s claim to the contrary,
there was little doubt that the fighters had been helped by the Pakistani army in taking
up these positions. The Kargil attack soon developed into a major crisis that brought
India and Pakistan close to war. Following weeks of intense diplomatic effort, a war
was averted by the direct intervention of the United States, which convinced then prime
minister Sharif to withdraw the troops and restore the Line of Control (Riedel 2002). In
retrospect the responsibility for the Kargil disaster has been blamed on general
Musharraf. Pakistan has only admitted to extending moral support to the Kashmiris, and
has consistently denied India’s charges of sponsoring “cross-border terrorism” and
being engaged in a proxy war in Kashmir and hiding behind a curtain of “plausible
deniability”. The Kargil disaster ended the credibility of “plausible deniability” and
made it clear to everyone that Pakistan covertly supported militant groups and was
engaged in a proxy war in Kashmir. The Kargil crisis also had severe political
repercussions in Pakistan and led to the ousting of prime minister Nawaz Sharif (Box
2).
                                                                                                                                                    
14 The organisation changed its name after being designated a foreign terrorist organization by the US
Department of State in October 1996.
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Box 2
India and Pakistan relations 1998–2001
Pakistan’s relations with India reached a low point in May 1998 following India’s nuclear tests,
followed shortly after by Pakistan’s nuclear tests in the Baluchistan desert, despite intense US
diplomatic efforts to prevent this very outcome. A year later relations warmed, not least because
of a deliberate policy of engagement by the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. The warming of
relations with India reached a high point in February 1999 when Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee, leader of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), came to Lahore in the
heart of Punjab. This was a significant symbolic gesture towards Pakistan. The Lahore
Declaration aimed to continue dialogue on the Kashmir issue in the spirit of the Simla
Agreement (1972) and to keep diplomatic contacts at the foreign minister level. At the meeting
the foreign ministers also met and worked out a memorandum of understanding that included a
series of confidence-building measures, some of them explicitly aimed at reducing the risk of
accidental war.
Only months later, the Kargil crisis plunged Indo-Pakistan relations to new depths and brought
the two countries to the brink of war (see main text). The humiliating defeat was the beginning
of the end for Nawaz Sharif. Shortly after, in September 1999, a power struggle between Sharif
and his hand-picked leader of the Armed Forces, General Pervez Musharraf, sealed Sharif’s
fate. He was brought down in a bloodless coup led by Musharraf. By July 2001 the relations
between India and Pakistan had improved enough for another high-level meeting, this time in
Agra in India. Shortly before leaving, Musharaf took the title of president, presumably because
this would enhance his bargaining position vis-à-vis the Indian prime minister Vajpayee. The
meeting was a setback for those that hoped for a settlement of hostilities between the two
countries. The talks ended without an agreement, with the long-running dispute over Kashmir
seen as the main reason for the deadlock. Musharraf also held a controversial, closed-door
meeting with Kashmiri separatist leaders, something that angered his Indian hosts.
Source: (Knudsen 2001a, Thornton 2000)
In a televised address delivered in Urdu to the Pakistani people in early January 2002,
president Musharraf renounced support of militants and stated his commitment to
building a moderate Islamic state (Musharraf 2002). Despite renouncing terrorism and
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the support of militants, Musharraf reaffirmed the country’s principal stand on Kashmir
and the continuation of moral, political and diplomatic support of the Kashmiri people
and the UN resolution of 1948. This notwithstanding, the question which is still
unanswered is how much control does Pakistan wield over these groups? The problem
facing president Musharraf, as well as civilian governments for the past decade, is that a
too radical crackdown on Kashmiri militants can backfire and cause domestic unrest.
Moreover, the country cannot afford to sever links with the militants and thereby
weaken the Kashmiri cause. Nonetheless, if Pakistan has nurtured and financed these
groups, how can it claim not to be able to control them? While it is clear that Pakistan is
able to control some of these groups, and has frozen their assets and jailed many of their
members, it is likely that it lacks the resources to control all the at least 18 militant
groups waging a “holy war” in Kashmir (see, Herald 2000). The more resourceful of the
Islamist parties, especially the JUI and JI, have built up Kashmiri “cells” which receive
most of the zakat funds collected by these parties (Herald 1994a). All the important
militant groups active in Kashmir operate from Pakistan and have close ties either with
Pakistan-based parties or sectarian groups (Table 1). Some of them also have ties with
the intelligence wing of the Pakistan army, the ISI. The ISI and the militants have a
common interest in keeping the Kashmir issue high on the agenda and perhaps even
unresolved. Some of the groups have close links with the Taliban and, possibly, the Al
Qaeda (see TERRORISTS).
The bigger and better organised among the groups are complex operations with their
own funding sources. Some of them also solicit donations from the families of slain
martyrs or collect money from various business ventures in Pakistan (ibid.). This makes
it extremely difficult to penetrate these organisations and even more difficult to prevent
them from recruiting, training and arming young freedom fighters. There is a constant
stream of Pakistani youths willing to lay down their lives as martyrs (Ar. Shahîd) for the
Kashmiri cause. Most of the recruits come from middle-class or lower middle-class
backgrounds and are therefore not, as is often claimed, from the poorer segments of
society. Both the martyrs and their families are accorded much respect and often helped
economically by the recruiting “cells” to bear the financial hardships the loss incurs
(see, Herald 1994a). In Pakistan there has always been much more popular support for
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Kashmir and the Kashmiris than there ever was for Afghanistan and the Taliban. These
sentiments have been nourished by national propaganda claiming that the Kashmiri
people are pining to join their brethren in Pakistan. In fact, the majority of the Muslim
Kashmiris would prefer independence or extensive political autonomy to accession to
Pakistan (Blank 1999).
Table 1
Examples of links between Kashmiri militants and Pakistani organisations
Linked to
Name
Party Sectarian organisation
Harakat ul-Mujaheddin (HUM) Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI)
Hizbul Mujaheddin (HM) Jamaat-e-Islam (JI)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JM) Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Source: (Herald 2000)
Although there is now much focus on Pakistan’s role in “sponsoring cross-border
terrorism” in Kashmir, the Kashmiri cause has tended to move out of focus. There is a
failure to acknowledge that the Kashmiri Muslims are fighting for their right to self-
determination, a campaign that has been brutally stamped out by heavy-handed Indian
army and police forces. Depending on the state of security relations with Pakistan, India
deploys between 300–700,000 soldiers in Kashmir, who keep an iron grip on the
Muslim population. It was also this situation that initially served to sharpen the conflict
from the mid-1990s and accounted for the growth of a “jehadist” type of conflict.
Unable to match India’s military might in conventional arms, Pakistan is forced to
resort to low-level warfare.
During the past year there have been series of incidents that have brought India and
Pakistan at the brink of war. It began on 1 October 2001 when two suicide assailants set
off a car bomb in the State Assembly in Srinagar. The death toll eventually reached 40
people. On 13 December 2001 the Indian parliament building in New Delhi was
attacked by suicide bombers presumably belonging to a Kashmiri militant group and
fourteen people (including five militants) were killed. The two Kashmiri militant
groups, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, were charged with the crime (see
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APPENDIX II). The symbolic importance of the strike against the parliament ensured that
the political fallout was severe. In a short time, the two countries were again brought to
the brink of war with increasingly militant rhetoric, especially from India. India, which
usually had played the more level-headed of the two countries, had gone from “cautious
to combative” (Goswami 2001). Following strong Indian and international pressure on
Pakistan to rein in the militant groups, president Musharraf announced in mid-January
2002 a ban on Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba and rounded up close to 2,000
militants. However, Pakistan refused India’s demand to hand over more than 20
Pakistani militants accused of fomenting terrorism. In late March, the majority of the
detained militants were set free.
In May 2002, the attack on an army base in Kashmir (30 persons killed), as well as the
killing of Abdul Ghani Lone, the prominent leader of the All-Party Hurriyat
Conference, again brought the two countries closer to war, including nuclear war, than
at any time since 1971. In both cases, the Indian government blamed Kashmir militants
operating from Pakistan for the misdeeds. Pakistan, as usual, claimed that they had done
all they could to prevent cross-border terrorism and only extended moral support to the
Kashmiris’ struggle. As both countries moved their army battalions towards the
Kashmiri border, there were also increased fears of a nuclear attack, especially because
Pakistan at that point had not ruled out a “first use” nuclear attack on India.15 Following
intense diplomatic pressure, both countries reduced their militant rhetoric and made
efforts to restore the fragile security balance along the Line of Control. Although the
fears of a major war have subsided, the threat of new attacks, especially from suicide
squads, might again move the countries to the brink of war. At the moment, the
unresolved Kashmir conflict remains the biggest security threat on the subcontinent.
                                                  
15 The details of the prospect for a nuclearised conflict between Pakistan and India falls beyond the scope
of this report. (but see, Ahmed 2000, Heisbourg 1998, Quinlan 2000, Talbott 1999) It is worth noting,
however, that neither country has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
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4. Terrorism
Taliban
The Taliban movement takes its name from the Arabic term “talib” meaning “student”.
The name indicates that the Taliban movement was born in the religious seminaries that
since the outbreak of the Afghan war had multiplied along Pakistan’s border with
Afghanistan. The seminaries, many of them funded by overseas sources (in particular
Saudi Arabian money), were closely associated with the Wahabism found in Saudi
Arabia. The schools therefore created a new breed of Islamic radicals espousing a
radical “neo-fundamentalist” creed of Islam (details below). From their bases in the
border regions of Pakistan, the Taliban took up the fight in Afghanistan and soon,
helped by Pakistan with weapons and training, quickly took control of Kabul. By
December 1996 the Taliban had captured most of Afghanistan with the exception of the
northeast, which was held by the so-called Northern Alliance led by the Uzbek warlord
General Abdur Rashid Dostum. Following the capture of Kabul, Pakistan was the first
country to recognise the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, one of only three countries
in the world to do so (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates). There are many reasons
why the new regime was never more widely acknowledged as the country’s legitimate
rulers. The regime’s repressive policies, in particular against women, angered the
international community. The destruction of the Buddha statues in the Bamyan province
in March 2001 further underlined the ruthless ideology of the Taliban regime. As we
will see below, this policy was a direct outgrowth of the Taliban regime’s adherence to
a strict neo-fundamentalist Islam.
The political ideology of the Taliban is also reflected in the political organisation of the
country. The country was run by a small group of leaders, in particular the reclusive
Mullah Mohammed Omar, who served as the movement’s ideological leader and was
referred to as the Commander of the Faithful (“Amir-ul Momineen”). At no point did
the Taliban attempt to build a semblance of a state but instead ran the country like a
large fiefdom. The country was run by a Supreme Shura based in Kandahar. The core of
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the Shura consisted of ten members, mainly close associates of Mullah Omar, and a less
influential group of about 50 persons made up of army commanders and tribal elders.
Two other Shuras concerned with civil (the Kabul Shura) and defence matters (the
Military Shura) reported to the Kandahar Shura. The Shuras were dominated by
Pashtuns with only a few non-Pashtun members (Rashid 2000: p. 98). The system of
Shuras was also extended to the countryside where a system of local-level Shuras was
formed, giving the regime considerable control of the populace (see, Strand et al. 2001).
The Taliban state model hence closely resembled the Islamist ideal of a leader (amir)
and an advisory council (shura) (see, Roy 1994: p. 43ff). Furthermore, the Taliban
leadership never took steps to draft a constitution, but relied exclusively on the Quran
and the Sharia implemented through the malignant “Ministry of Vice and Virtue”.
The Taliban espouse what Olivier Roy has termed a “neo-fundamentalist” Islam (See
ISLAM). Many of the Taliban’s top leaders were educated in the Dar-ul-Uloom
Haqqania, located in Akhora Khattok (NWFP) and led by Samiul Haq. He is also a
former member of the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan and the current leader
of one of the fractions of the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) (See PARTIES). The JUI and
the Taliban share a common Deobandi base that has influenced their religious outlook.
The Taliban’s “Ambassador at large” Rahmatullah Hashemi has said that “Every
Afghan is a Deobandi” (quoted in, Metcalf Online)
The economic base of the Taliban was always weak, reflecting both the international
boycott of the regime and the result of twenty years of war and civil war. The regime
therefore relied primarily on an informal economy based on siphoning the profits from
the country’s massive illegal drug production.16 The Taliban also relied on illegal
exports, smuggling and cross-border trade along the Pakistan-Afghan border, which
resulted in enormous amounts of lost revenues that negatively affected Pakistan’s
economy (Rashid 2000: p. 192). At a later stage, the Taliban leadership formed an
alliance with Osama bin Laden, who contributed money and fighters to the regime (see
TERRORISTS). In 1998, when the US request to extradite bin Laden failed, it launched a
cruise missile attack (over Pakistani airspace) a couple of weeks later that failed to
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dislodge bin Laden. This was followed by an Executive Order freezing all Taliban
assets in the US and, a year later, the UN Security Council imposed further sanctions on
Afghanistan (Resolution 1267). Nonetheless, the Taliban regime was mostly left to its
own devices and apart from being considered a “rogue state” that sponsored terrorism
nothing was done to dislodge the Taliban leadership or to intervene in Afghanistan. This
changed dramatically in October 2001 when the United States decided to take military
action aimed at toppling Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.
Pakistan was deeply involved in creating, nurturing and sustaining the regime. In
particular, the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), was in
charge of Pakistan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan with minimal interference
from elected governments and public servants. Support of the Taliban became a
cornerstone in Pakistan’s foreign policy, mainly because a friendly government in
Kabul was a key to the military doctrine known as “strategic depth”. In short, this meant
that in the event on an attack from India, Pakistan could extend its reach westwards.
During peacetime, it would allow the Pakistan army to devote more of its military
personnel and armoury towards its eastern border with India, and especially the disputed
boundary (the Line of Control) along the Jammu and Kashmir province. In this respect,
there was a direct link between Pakistan’s Afghan policy and its strategic engagement in
Kashmir. Support of the Taliban also made it possible to utilise camps inside
Afghanistan for training recruits for the fight in Kashmir. Following the demise of the
Taliban regime, the “strategic depth” doctrine has been abandoned altogether. The army
and the ISI deplores this change, fearing that the new leadership in Afghanistan may
become a “strategic threat” to Pakistan. It has been argued that Pakistan’s Afghan policy
did not provide strategic depth to Pakistan, but that it was rather Pakistan which was
providing strategic depth to the Taliban regime (Rashid 2000: p. 187).
The Taliban movement is, despite an increasing number of books on the subject, not
well understood by Western analysts (see, Harpviken 1999). Originally the Taliban set
out to be an Islamic reform movement. Although the movement has been a source of
admiration and inspiration for Islamists elsewhere, the movement itself was not pan-
                                                                                                                                                    
16 It is worth noting, however, that the Taliban regime successfully curbed drug production following
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Islamic. There is little evidence that the movement aspired to export its particular brand
of Islam. The Taliban issued neither political manifestos nor policy statements. What
little there is of documentation of its political philosophy, however, suggests that the
Taliban combined Pashtun cultural tenets with a dogmatic scripturalist Islam.
The collapse of the Taliban regime has led to the question of possible scenarios for a
“post-Taliban” Afghanistan (see, Ayoob 2002). While the political make-up of the new
regime in Afghanistan falls beyond the scope of this study, the future role of the Taliban
movement is an important question. The military campaign against the Taliban has
shown that most of the rank-and-file members simply disappeared or changed sides. A
substantial number also left for Pakistan, hiding in the North-West Frontier Province or
moving into Pakistani cities, where they went underground (see TERRORISTS). It has
been claimed that the Taliban had spurred the growth of Taliban sympathisers in
Pakistan and promoted the growth of radical Islamic groups. In particular, the Taliban
enjoyed close ties with the JUI, which subscribed to the same neo-fundamentalist
doctrine as the Taliban. This phenomenon has been referred to as “Talibanisation” and
although not confined to Pakistan (but also used with reference to China, Central Asian
States, Kashmir) the term has been pinned especially on Pakistan (Knudsen 2001b). It
has also been speculated that the Taliban was a major reason for the intensification of
the Kashmir conflict from the mid-1990s and that the insurgency was spurred by the
Taliban (see KASHMIR).
Ahmed Rashid (1999) has argued that the Taliban exported militant extremism to
neighbouring countries. However, the aspects just mentioned suggest that Afghanistan
and the Taliban regime were primarily a safe haven for groups of differing ethnic
affiliations and Islamic persuasions (Uzbek rebels, Iranian dissidents, Uighur militants
etc.) but which the Taliban saw it as advantageous to support. The main point was hence
not so much to export extremism as to provide a safe haven for groups that served the
interests of the regime itself. Following the same line of argument, the Al Qaeda
provided money and dedicated personnel that complemented the goals of the Taliban. It
might be argued, then, that Talibanisation was less an export of a purely Taliban-style
                                                                                                                                                    
sanctions (Resolution 1333) imposed by the UN Security Council in December 2000.
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Islam, and more about providing a safe haven for different groups to operate from
Afghanistan. An important question for this study is the extent to which Taliban regime
in Afghanistan also fomented the militant Islamic insurgency in Kashmir.
Terrorists
In 1992 Pakistan was put on the US State Department “watch list” of countries
sponsoring terrorism. The reason was that the US believed that the Army’s intelligence
agency (ISI) obstructed plans to buy back the unused Stinger missiles from the Afghan
mujahedin. Following the removal of ISI officers named by the US, Pakistan was
removed from the list in July 1993 (Rizvi 1998). Since then, the charge of sponsoring
terrorism was first of all linked to the activity of Muslim militants in Kashmir, in
particular those targeting foreign nationals. In 1996, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)
(a.k.a. Harakat ul-Ansar, HUA, Al-Hadid, Al-Hadith, Al-Faran) was put on the US
Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) following its
involvement in killing foreign tourists in Kashmir such as the Norwegian Per Christian
Osterø (see APPENDIX II). He was kidnapped in Kashmir in July 1995 and later killed by
the “Al-Faran”, a subsidiary group of the HUM. No reason was ever given for killing
Osterø as well as the four other Western hostages (including one American) presumed
killed later the same year. Most likely they were killed because the Indian government
declined to give in to the demand for the release of 21 jailed members of the
organisation. Until know, this has been the only incident of its kind in Kashmir.
While militancy has been a clear trend during the past decade, terrorism is new.
Although it is difficult to separate the two, one could say that militancy involves parties
to the conflict in an armed struggle against each other, while terrorism uses a third party
not directly involved in the conflict. Thus militancy is primarily dyadic (aggressor and
victim), but terrorism is triadic (aggressor, victim, witness), where the killing is
politically motivated and therefore tends to target innocents. A very high number of
civilians have been killed in the Kashmir conflict during the past decade, but the
international community has in general considered them “casualties of war” rather than
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victims of terrorism (see KASHMIR). Following the 11 September attacks and the US-led
coalition against terrorism, India’s claim that Pakistan is covertly engaged in “cross-
border terrorism” has gained wider support. There is now credible evidence that most of
the militant “outfits” operate from bases in Pakistani or the nominal free state of Azad
Kashmir controlled by Pakistan (see KASHMIR). Moreover, a considerable number of the
militants, especially the “guest militants”, have been trained and outfitted in
Afghanistan. This has been possible by virtue of the close links between the ISI and the
Afghan authorities that predated the Taliban regime. Some of the members of the older
Kashmiri liberation groups such as HUM also had close personal links with the Afghan
mujaheddin groups and fought alongside them during the Afghan war. After the Taliban
takeover they continued to enjoy close relations with the Taliban, and possibly also the
Al Qaeda (Herald 2000).
The Al Qaeda (“the base”) and its leader Osama bin Laden have been under intense
media scrutiny since the attack on the United States on 11 September 2001.
Synthesising this material is beyond the scope of this report, which is limited to the
organisation’s operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Already in 1999, the Al Qaeda
was added to the FTO list for its involvement in several terrorist attacks, including the
August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania. The ideology of the Al Qaeda has already been touched upon (see JIHAD), and
involves armed struggle against the United States, its citizens and allies as well as
cleansing Muslim countries of their corrupt leadership (in particular Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and Algeria). A secondary goal of the Al Qaeda is to support (or form) radical
Islamic groups and support Muslim militants in selected countries, including
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
From its inception in 1988, the Al Qaeda had over the years evolved into a huge and
complex organisation spanning many Middle Eastern countries with a number of
associates and members drawn principally from the Arab countries (see, Alexander and
Swetnam 2001). The details of the organisation’s membership are beyond the scope of
this report, but the nature of the organisation, especially the concept of “network”,
deserves special mention. Much in the same way as the Taliban regime, the Al Qaeda
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was loosely organised around an inner circle of about 10 persons forming an executive
council (Shura Majlis), followed by executive committees covering amongst other
things military training and religious education. Already in 1979, bin Laden had left his
native Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan, where he joined the Afghan mujahedin (1978–88).
He returned to Afghanistan in 1996 after being forced to leave Sudan as well as having
his Saudi Arabian citizenship revoked (in 1994). In Afghanistan he developed close ties
with the Taliban leadership. The details of these ties are presently not known (but see,
Rashid 2000). What we do know is that despite intense pressure on the Taliban regime
to extradite bin Laden, they never did. Neither US cruise missiles attacks (1998),
diplomatic pressure, repeated UN sanctions, Pakistani mediation (2001), nor the threat
of full-scale war (2001) was able to dislodge bin Laden and create a rift between the
Taliban proper and the Al Qaeda. This is indicative of the extent to which the Taliban
leadership had become dependent on bin Laden and the Al Qaeda. The nature of
Pakistan’s relations with Al Qaeda is not well known. However, it is known that for a
brief period (1989–91), the organisation was headquartered in Pakistan (Alexander and
Swetnam 2001: p. 4). However, there is no evidence that the Pakistan authorities at any
point enjoyed close relations with the Al Qaeda in the manner that they did with the
Taliban regime. It is clear, however, that the Al Qaeda did develop close relations with
some of the militant groups and parties in Pakistan as well as those in Kashmir (see
KASHMIR)
The most striking feature of the Al Qaeda is its organisational structure, which has been
characterised as a “network”. Networks have a long and distinguished history in binding
together the people and faiths of the Islamic world. In the 20th century, the main
religious networks were those of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, serving as a centre
for the Arab countries, and the Jamaat-e-Islami on the Indian subcontinent (Roy 1994:
p. 110). The network of the Al Qaeda, however, is not primarily religious but motivated
by a pragmatic concern with evading control and frustrating surveillance. To
accomplish this, the organisation is loosely structured around a number of independent
terrorist “cells” spanning many countries, which makes it very difficult to target. The Al
Qaeda is not only a terrorist network but also a business conglomerate. An estimated
US$ 43 million of the Al Qaeda’s bank assets have been frozen (Time 2001), but much
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of the organisation’s economic transactions have not been banked and instead have
utilised an informal Islamic exchange system known as hawala (Hindi meaning “trust”
or “exchange”). More concretely, this is an unofficial remittance and money exchange
system that allows money to be moved between independent “brokers” or “operators”
(hawaladars) without leaving a paper or electronic “trail”. The Al Qaeda’s use of the
hawala system has made it difficult to trace its economic transactions and therefore to
target the organisation.
As seen above, evading control is key to the formation of an Al Qaeda type of
organisation. It has therefore been argued that in order to prosper, terrorists and their
network need what is labelled “failed states” (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). The authors
point to four reasons why this is the case. First, they can broker a place for themselves
by offering to partake in local wars. Examples of this include Bosnia, Kosovo,
Chechnya, Sudan and, appropriately, Afghanistan. Secondly, failed states have weak
law-enforcement capabilities and thereby allowing terrorists to engage in smuggling and
drug trafficking to fund their operations. Third, failed states provide a large pool of
potential recruits and supporters for terrorist groups. Finally, failed states are shielded
from intervention from another sovereign state through the UN Charter. Under normal
circumstances this prevents direct intervention aimed at dislodging the regime, thereby
providing terrorists with a safe haven. This, therefore, explains why Afghanistan was so
well suited to the needs of the Al Qaeda.
Following the collapse of the Taliban regime, it has been claimed that some of the Al
Qaeda soldiers relocated to Kashmir. This claim was recently reiterated by US Defence
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (BBC News 2002c). However, keeping in mind the points
made above, it is possible to understand why Kashmir is not a “safe heaven” for the Al
Qaeda. First, the Vale of Kashmir is heavily policed and guarded by a government
hostile to the organisation. There are about 3,500 militants in Kashmir. They are up
against approximately 300,000 Indian security forces (currently close to 700,000 troops
are stationed in Kashmir). This makes Kashmir – despite its rugged landscape – less
suited as a base for terrorist activity. In addition, it should be remembered that Osama
bin Laden did not take any special interest in Kashmir. His main agenda was the fight
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against the USA and its allies. An area that would fit some of the criteria for a “safe
haven” for the Al Qaeda fighters (and possibly, its leaders) is the “tribal areas” along the
border separating Pakistan and Afghanistan (see FRONTIER). There are many reasons
why this is a viable option: the area is remote, politically autonomous and ruled by
strong tribal chiefs. The Pakistani authorities have only a limited jurisdiction of the area.
There is a general sympathy with the Taliban on ethnic and religious grounds. A recent
news bulletin suggests that Al Qaeda fighters have sought refuge in the tribal areas of
Pakistan (BBC News 2002b). According to this report, Pakistani troops killed 10 Al
Qaeda fighters near the garrison town Wana, located in the South Waziristan Agency,
one of the remotest and least hospitable of the tribal agencies (Figure 2).
With the exception of a series of assassinations of Iranians by Sunni militants during the
past decade, there have been very few attacks targeting foreigners in Pakistan
(excluding Kashmir). In 1998 four Americans employed by a Houston oil company
were gunned down in Karachi. The culprits were never found. Following the American
attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, terrorist attacks have multiplied. They
include: the killing of the American Wall Street journalist Daniel Pearl by a group led
by the British-born militant Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh (a.k.a. Sheikh Omar); a bomb
attack in an Islamabad church killing 5 people; a bomb killing 11 French engineers; and
finally, a bomb attack on the United States Consulate in Karachi killing at least 11
Pakistanis (14 June 2002), blamed on Laskar-e-Jhangvi. It is probably no coincidence
that with one exception, all these attacks took place in Karachi, Pakistan’s most lawless
city. This makes Karachi a suitable hideout for militants as well as a temporary base for
members of the Al Qaeda (Herald 2001a, Time 2002a).17
                                                  
17 In September 2002 Ramzi Binalshibh, a senior Al Qaeda member accused of having planned the 11
September attacks was arrested in Karachi. In March the police arrested Abu Zubaidah, a senior bin
Laden deputy, in Faisalabad. (New York Times 2002)
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Conclusion: Whither political Islam?
As Stephen Cohen, a long-time Pakistan analyst has noted, Pakistan is not a trivial state
(Cohen 2002). The country is large, populous, geostrategically important and armed
with nuclear weapons. It is also central to the growth of political Islam on the
subcontinent, and some argue, under siege from Islamic militants. While the imminent
collapse of Pakistan is often predicted (ICPI 2002), the fact is that Pakistan is too
important to be allowed to disintegrate. “The survival of Pakistan in its existing form is
a vital U.S. security interest”, notes Anatol Lieven (2002). This does not mean that
Pakistan is not under pressure or that the threat from political Islam amounts to little.
Still, it is important not to lose perspective: Pakistan is an Islamic country with a
militant Islamic lobby, it is not a country of Islamists. This said, the radical Islamic
groups have made brutal violence against enemies their hallmark.
The ban on all extremist groups in Pakistan from early 2002 has been a major setback
for the militants but they are far from beaten. No decisive action has been taken to end
the role of the militants either in Pakistan or in Kashmir. This is the result both of a
general inability to control or suppress groups that are organisationally complex and of
a fear of alienating forces that have been (and still are) important for advancing foreign
policy goals in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. The current upsurge of terrorist strikes in
Pakistan could indicate that Pakistan is now experiencing a backlash from its leniency
in coming to terms with these groups. An additional reason for this leniency is that
many of the most important militant groups enjoy official (army) patronage: they are
not enemies of the state but immanent to the state.
While the militant groups pose a danger to foreigners, they do not represent a serious
challenge to the army and the current government. The claim of a “fundamentalist
takeover” in Pakistan is both unlikely and farfetched. What does pose a security threat
to Pakistan, its leadership and citizens is the Kashmir conflict. India and Pakistan’s
dangerous war-games in Kashmir have repeatedly brought the two countries to the brink
of war. On every occasion the crisis has been precipitated not by advancing armies, but
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by calculated attacks by Islamic militants at times aided by the Pakistan army. The
failed Kargil offensive in 1999 shows that the Pakistani army is willing to take great
security risks in order to force a military solution to the Kashmir problem. In this
respect the democratically elected governments have charted a much more conciliatory
course, as exemplified by the Lahore Declaration signed under former prime minister
Nawaz Sharif.
The return to “true” democracy in Pakistan at the moment looks bleak. The mainstream
parties PPP and PML are both weakened at the same time as president Pervez
Musharraf has taken steps to increase his powers under the presidency, giving him the
right to dismiss a new parliament and prime minister and set up a shadow government
in the form of a national security council that he controls. It is therefore likely that any
democratically elected government will be short-lived and sure not to survive its full
term in office, as in fact no elected government in Pakistan ever has. All of them have
been deposed by the military or dismissed by presidential fiat. The Islamic parties
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) will also this time win few votes,
although the may have won a few hearts for their principled stand against the American
attack on the Taliban regime.
They are also close allies in Pakistan of the former Taliban regime. Although the
Taliban has been defeated militarily, it can still present a long-term challenge to a future
government in Afghanistan. The presence of Taliban fighters in Pakistan’s tribal areas
and possibly also in some of the major cities might pose a security threat, especially if
they ally themselves with the country’s most militant groups. In this sense the Taliban
will not go away, but continue to represent a security challenge to Pakistan and the new
government of Afghanistan. It will therefore be important to continue to monitor the
situation in the North-West Frontier Province where age-old ethnic, cultural and
religious ties between Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan die hard. Nonetheless, it is
unlikely that the tribal areas will become a hotbed for an extremist political Islam. The
Pashtun tribesmen in the tribal areas are devout Muslims but they are neither extremists
nor terrorists. Nor is it likely that a “limited number of Pakistani tribal and religious
volunteers slipping over the border [will] … revive the Taliban. Outright support for the
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Taliban from a radicalized Pakistani state, however, could do just that” (Lieven 2002: p.
107).
The government of Pakistan has tried to rein in the Islamic seminaries but only half-
heartedly. The latest “madrassa strategy” is sure to be opposed by the seminaries and
their allies in the religious parties (JI, JUI). Having successfully evaded government
control for so long, better control of the seminaries’ funding and curricula will be hard
to accomplish without the use of force. In all likelihood the present situation will
continue unless the seminaries can be persuaded willingly to accede to more
government control. However, a carrot and stick approach might not work because
many seminaries consider government patronage a political bribe. There is a consensus
that the seminaries have been crucial to the growth of political Islam and launched the
Taliban movement, but blaming the seminaries for all the country’s problems is
nevertheless unwarranted and suggests that the seminaries may serve as a convenient
scapegoat. In a country that has ignored formal education, the seminaries have promoted
basic literacy (and, no doubt, militancy) otherwise inaccessible to Pakistan’s poor. This
is also an argument in favour of international support for Pakistan’s attempt to reform
the education sector, which until now has been overlooked.
It is commonly assumed that “poverty breeds extremism”. This report shows that there
is limited support for this assumption in the case of Pakistan. It is not poverty that has
bred extremism, but rather a series of contingent factors ranging from foreign policy and
military objectives (“strategic depth”, “proxy war”), historical trajectories (the Afghan
war, the Kashmir conflict) as well as years of military rule, not the least the Islamisation
programme under Zia ul-Haq (1977–88). These factors contributed to a groundswell of
political Islam. Democracy’s failure also contributed to the growth of Islamic
extremism and helped it flourish. The growth of sectarian violence has been staggering
and with few serious attempts to control it. The most recent attacks in Karachi suggest
that the most virulent of the sectarian groups have become terrorist outfits.
Nonetheless, during the past decade there have been few examples of outright terrorist
attacks in Pakistan. The presence of members of the Al Qaeda as well as Taliban
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soldiers suggests that in the near future there will be more terrorist attacks aimed at
foreigners and political opponents. The current government has so far been able neither
to prevent these attacks nor to catch those responsible. This is not only for lack of will,
but because the attackers are ruthless and well organised. This report has pointed to the
“enlargement” of the concept of jihad, which is now used to justify murderous attacks
on religious (“Shia infidels”, “American Crusaders”) and political opponents (“Indian
oppressors”). Invoking jihad has been done in order to clothe political violence with an
aura of religious legitimacy. Attempts to delimit the use of jihad, as tried by president
Musharraf, will no doubt be ignored by those who espouse jihad (in the sense of “holy
war”) as a religious duty for every Muslim.
This report has tried to chart some of the elements that contribute to growth of political
Islam in Pakistan. Influential scholars such as Gilles Kepel (2002) and Olivier Roy
(1994) have predicted the demise of political Islam. It is still too early to say whether
Pakistan is not only a country where we can see the growth of political Islam, but also
one were we can learn of its demise.
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Appendix I: List of interviews
Abdul Matin Principal
Authentic Academy
Amarpura, Rawalpindi
Mr. Shaukat Qadir Political Analyst
Institute of Regional Affairs
Islamabad
Mr. Ershad Mehmood Research Officer
Institute of Policy Studies
Islamabad
Maulana Abdul Aziz  Khatib
Jamia Masjid Ehle Hadith
Islamabad
Maulana Alam Biaz Khatib and Imam
Mohammadi Mosque,
Rawalpindi
Ms. Shaheen Akhtar Institute of Regional Studies
Islamabad
Mr. Najum Mushtaq Int. Crisis Group Office
Islamabad
Appendix II
Overview of Islamic groups and parties in Pakistan
Name English name Leader Denomination Status
Parties Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) Association of Ulemas of Islam
Maulana Fazlur
Rehman, Maulana
Samiul Haq Sunni leader detained, later released
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) Party of Islam
Qazi Hussein Ahmed
(Liaquat Baluch) Sunni Leader detained, later released
Militants Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) Army of Jhangvi Akram Lahori Sunni banned 14 August 2001
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
Society for the Soldiers of the Companions of the
Prophet Maulana Azam Tariq Sunni banned 12 January 2002
Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP) Soldiers of Prophet Mohammad in Pakistan unknown Shia banned 14 August 2001
Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) Movement of the Jafari Shia Pakistan
Allama Arif Hussain al-
Hussaini Shia banned 12 January 2002
Tehrik Nifaz Shari'a-e-Mohammadi
(TSNM) The Movement of Enforcing the Sharia of Mohammad Sufi Mohammed Sunni banned 12 January 2002
Insurgents Lashkar-e-Toiba (LT) Army of the Pure Mohammed Latif Sunni banned 12 January 2002
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM) Army of Mohammed Maulana Masood Azar Sunni banned 12 January 2002
Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM) Movement of Religious Fighters Farooq Kashmiri Sunni
declared terrorist org, US. State Dept.,
1996
Hizbul Mujaheddin (HM) Group of Sacred Warriors Syeed Salahuddin Sunni
Others Afghan Defence Council Maulana Samiul Haq Sunni leader detained, later released
Appendix III
Religious seminaries in the Punjab, 1975–2001
Division 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 2001
Bahawalpur 278 417 598 795 883 971
D. G. Khan 153 217 297 363 411 397
Multan 45 102 179 212 325 363
Lahore 75 120 170 219 323 356
Rawalpindi 58 85 119 157 169 186
Sargodha 75 98 130 148 149 164
Gujranwala 52 66 96 131 140 154
Faisalabad ? ? ? ? 112 124
Total 736 1105 1589 2025 2512 2715
Sources: Zaman (1998: p. 710), Herald (2001d)
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